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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. PREECE, 
Petitioner, 
TOM HOUSE, Warden, 
PETE HAUN, Chairman of the 
Board of Pardons, HEATHER 
COOK, Member of the Board of 
Pardons, and other individual 
members of the Board of Pardons 
whose identities are 
presently unknown, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 920605 
Priority No. 13 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (1992), which grants the Utah Supreme 
Court appellate jurisdiction to review "a judgment of the Court of 
Appeals." Preece's petition for a Writ of Certiorari was granted 
on March 24, 1993. 
Also presented as an issue in this case is the interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h), which gives to the Utah Court of 
Appeals original appellate jurisdiction over "appeals from the 
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first 
1 
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degree or capital felony." Utah Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 
1993). 
Because Preece's petition conceivably "involved" his first-
degree felony conviction, the Utah Court of Appeals may not have 
had original appellate jurisdiction over this case. Therefore, 
this Court would not have jurisdiction by writ of certiorari but by 
way of direct appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) 
(Supp. 1993), which gives this Court original appellate 
jurisdiction in all cases over which the Court of Appeals has not. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals have original appellate 
jurisdiction over respondent's appeal? 
2. Did the trial court exceed its lawful authority by 
ordering Preece released from custody? 
3. Do Utah's sentencing and release guidelines create an 
expectancy of release that is protected by the due process clause? 
4. What is the appropriate remedy for the violation of an 
administrative rule of the Board of Pardons? 
5. Did the Board's written explanation of April 13, 1993 
provide Preece with all the relief this Court can order, therefore 
mooting the case? 
2 
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues of jurisdiction and mootness were not presented to 
the Utah Court of Appeals; therefore, they are before this Court 
for original decision rather than review. 
Concerning the other issues in this case, the applicable 
standards of review are as follows. The trial court's findings 
will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Stewart 
v. State, 830 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah App. 1992). Its legal 
conclusions, however, are reviewed for correctness. Termunde v. 
Cook, 786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990) (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 
783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989); see generally Stewart, 830 P.2d at 308. 
Likewise, in reviewing by writ of certiorari a decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, this Court reviews the legal conclusions for 
correctness. Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1992); Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318 (Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules 
are attached to this brief as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a review on certiorari of a decision of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, which reversed the order of the district court granting 
Preece's petition for extraordinary relief and ordering his 
immediate release. Preece v. House, 848 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1993) 
(Addendum B). 
3 
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On or about July 1, 1982, Preece was committed to the Utah 
State Prison for two counts of Aggravated Robbery, a first-degree 
felony. (R. at 2-3). While incarcerated at the prison, Preece 
committed manslaughter, a second-degree felony, for which he was 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for one to fifteen years to run 
concurrent with his other sentences. Id. 
On May 31, 1991, Preece was given a parole grant re-hearing, 
conducted by Board of Pardons' member Heather Cook. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, Cook told Preece that she was going to 
recommend to the other Board members that they give Preece a parole 
date of May 11, 1993. (R. 98; Addendum C, Order, Preece v. House, 
Third District Court, Case No. 920902447, filed November 5, 1992).1 
At the time of the hearing, Board staff had provided Cook with a 
calculation, figuring out Preece7s parole date according to the 
Utah Sentence and Release guidelines. Id. That calculated date 
came to 147 months, October 11, 1994. 
On June 4, 1991, the full Board met to consider Preece's 
parole status. The other Board members chose not to accept Cook's 
recommended parole date of May 11, 1993 and, instead, ordered a 
parole date of October 11, 1994. In May 1992, Preece filed this 
1
 Neither of Preece#s hearings before the Board of Pardons 
were introduced into evidence in the trial court; therefore, his 
use of those transcripts is inappropriate in this appeal. Because 
the Board's transcripts are not part of the trial court's record, 
respondents will only cite to the portions of Judge Young's record 
that reflect the representations made to him regarding the Board's 
hearing process. 
4 
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petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B, alleging, 
among other things, that Cook was not impartial and that the 
sentencing and release guidelines created an expectancy of release. 
Sometime during the summer of 1992, the previous counsel for 
respondents, Steven Morrisett, Assistant Attorney General, realized 
that the guidelines date had been calculated incorrectly. (R. 123; 
Tr. Hearing before Hon. David S. Young, Preece v. House, Civil No. 
920902447, July 20, 1992, at 3). 
He asked the Board staff to recalculate the guidelines and 
they found that the correct figure was 111 months (nine years, 
three months) rather than 147 months (twelve years, three months). 
Morrissett notified the court of this recalculation at a hearing on 
July 20, 1991 and also informed the court that he had recommended 
to the Board that it provide Preece with a re-hearing. Id. 
Because it appeared that the Board was going to be providing Preece 
with a new hearing, the court continued the matter. At no time did 
the court order the Board of Pardons to hold a hearing, provide a 
written explanation, or give any additional information to Preece. 
(R. 130; Tr. Hearing before Hon. David S. Young, Preece v. House, 
Civil No. 920902447, July 20, 1992, at 3). 
On September 18, 1992, Board member Don Blanchard conducted a 
special attention hearing at which Preece was present. On October 
6, 1992, the Board met and re-affirmed Preece's October 11, 1994 
parole date. Preece then filed a motion to amend his petition, 
adopting the allegations of the original rule 65B petition and also 
5 
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alleging that the Board had failed to provide him with a 
justification for exceeding the guidelines. (R. 77) . The trial 
court entered an order allowing petitioner to file an amended 
petition (R. 82) and respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss and 
Memorandum in Support. Respondents argued that the petition was 
improperly brought pursuant to Rule 65B(c) and that it was within 
the Board's sole discretion to grant a parole date outside the 
sentencing and release guidelines. (R. 84-88) . 
On November 2, 1992, a hearing was held before Judge David S. 
Young. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Young granted the 
rule 65B petition and ordered Preece's immediate release from 
custody. In his signed minute entry, Judge Young found that 
petitioner [Preece] is entitled to an explanation of the 
error which the Board refuses to do. Further due process 
requires fair process and a petitioner is entitled to an 
explanation of why the error should be ignored and the 
longer term served. It is cruel and unusual punishment 
to do otherewise [sic]. The petitioner has been denied 
due process and has been treated to cruel and unusual 
punishment when no correction or explanation is given as 
to the mistake and the time to be served by the 
petitioner. 
(R. 90-91). 
Judge Young denied respondent's motion to stay his order 
releasing Preece from prison; therefore, respondents sought and 
obtained an ex parte motion for stay from the Utah Court of 
Appeals. (R. 94). The Court of Appeals held a hearing on 
respondents' motion to stay and, as a consequence, summarily 
reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proceedings. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents that the 
trial court did not have the authority to terminate Preece's 
sentence and that the appropriate remedy available to the district 
court was to be found in rule 65B(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, i.e., to order the Board to expeditiously provide Preece 
with a written explanation of its reasons for its parole decision, 
as required by Utah Admin. Code R671-305-2 (1992). (R. 112; 
Addendum B, Preece v. House, 848 P.2d 163, 164 (Utah App. 1993)). 
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the trial court incorrectly 
found that the Utah Sentencing and Release Guidelines created an 
enforceable liberty interest. Id. This Court granted a writ of 
certiorari on March 24, 1993. 
On April 13, 1993, the Board responded to the Court of 
Appeals' opinion by sending to Preece a written rationale stating 
its reasons for the parole-release decision. (See, Addendum D, 
affidavit of Patricia L. Neeley). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All facts relevant to this case are set forth in the Statement 
of the Case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Preece was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison for 
committing two first-degree felonies. Although his rule 65B 
petition for extraordinary relief does not challenge those 
convictions, it "involves" them because the complaint challenges 
the Board's calculation of his parole-release date, based on the 
7 
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Utah Sentencing and Release Guidelines. Under the guidelines, the 
degree of offense is the primary factor in calculating the release 
date. The 1992 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h), which 
places in this Court jurisdiction over appeals from orders 
disposing of petitions for extraordinary writs that challenge Board 
of Pardons decisions involving first-degree felonies, may not be 
the wisest policy choice. However, it has been adopted by the 
legislature and this Court is obligated to interpret it according 
to its plain meaning. 
The only word in the amendment that requires interpretation is 
the word "involves." The dictionary meaning of that term supports 
the respondent's interpretation. It does not lead to the 
complicated dichotomy set out by petitioner in his brief to this 
Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction 
over this case and its opinion should be vacated. Instead, this 
Court has original appellate jurisdiction over respondent's appeal 
and should treat this case as a direct appeal. 
Preece's case is now moot because, by giving Preece a written 
explanation of its parole-release decision, the Board has already 
given Preece the only relief that a court can lawfully give him --
an order to comply with an order issued in response to a rule 
65B(e) petition. When the trial court ordered Preece's immediate 
release, it exceeded its constitutional and statutory authority. 
Under the state constitution and statute, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole has the sole authority to terminate the sentence of a 
8 
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lawfully convicted and sentenced prisoner. This Court has 
consistently recognized that exclusive power. Preece has not 
alleged, nor do any of the facts establish, that either his 
conviction or sentence were unlawful; therefore, his restraint is 
not wrongful but is, in fact, a lawful consequence of a judicial 
commitment to prison. 
Because Preece's restraint is lawful, extraordinary relief 
pursuant to rule 65B(c) (the successor to the common-law writ of 
habeas corpus) is not available and his release from custody is not 
an appropriate remedy. The only relief that would be available is 
found under Rule 65B(e) (the successor to the common-law writs of 
mandamus and certiorari). However, the case law of certiorari and 
mandamus does not allow release but only authorizes the courts to 
order the Board to fulfill a duty required by law. Thus, the trial 
court should have proceeded pursuant to rule 65B(e) and merely 
ordered the Board to provide a written explanation for its parole 
decision. 
The Board did exactly this on April 13, 1993. Thus, all the 
relief that a court could order has been given Preece and the 
courts can grant no further relief to him. Under the case law 
established by this Court then, Preece's case is moot and Judge 
Young's order should be vacated. 
9 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS LACKED JURISDICTION OVER 
RESPONDENT'S DIRECT APPEAL BECAUSE THE CASE INVOLVED A 
FIRST-DEGREE FELONY; THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD EXAMINE 
THIS CASE AS A DIRECT APPEAL. 
In 1992, the legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 to 
give original appellate jurisdiction to the Utah Court of Appeals 
of "appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs 
challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony." Utah Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(h) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). Because first-degree and 
capital felonies are excepted from that court's original appellate 
jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1993) places 
jurisdiction over this appeal in the Utah Supreme Court by giving 
this Court jurisdiction of cases over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
As the complaint shows, Preece was originally incarcerated for 
two counts of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony. (R. at 2-
3; Addendum E). The essence of Preece's complaint, and of Judge 
Young's order, is that the Board of Pardons violated Preece's 
constitutional rights by failing to comply with the Utah Sentencing 
and Release Guidelines ("Guidelines") in calculating Preece's 
parole release date. Specifically, Preece alleges that the parole 
date of October 11, 1994 is \mconstitutional because it goes beyond 
the Guidelines date. 
10 
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Although the degree of Preece's crimes was not the only factor 
in the Board's decision to grant an October 11, 1994 release date, 
Preece's case does "involve" a first-degree felony because in 
calculating a date pursuant to the Guidelines, the degree of 
offense is of primary importance. Before other factors are even 
taken into consideration (such as criminal history, efforts at 
rehabilitation) , a Guidelines calculation starts with the degree of 
offense. (See Addendum F, Utah Sentencing and Release Guidelines, 
Form 4, Time Matrix). Therefore, because Preece's rule 65B 
petition is, in essence, a complaint about the Board's calculation 
of his parole-release date, the case involves his first-degree 
felony convictions as well as his second-degree felony conviction 
for manslaughter, even though it does not challenge those 
convictions or sentences. 
Preece interprets section 78-2a-3(h) to allow the Utah Court 
of Appeals to review cases challenging procedural aspects of a 
Board action, while reserving for this Court challenges to the 
substantive nature of the Board's decision. Preece argues that 
this dichotomy reflects the best policy for the allocation of 
jurisdiction between the Utah Court of Appeals and this Court. 
However, even though the 1992 amendment may make little practical 
sense, this Court should not accept Preece's recommendation because 
it goes far beyond the plain language of the statute. Section 78-
2a-3(h) says nothing about substance or procedure; indeed, the only 
word in that provision that may be ambiguous is "involving." 
11 
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{ 
The dictionary meaning of "involving" does not lead to the 
complicated dichotomy that Preece sets out. According to Webster's 
Dictionary (1988), "involve" means: (1) to include or contain as a 
part or; (2) to have as an essential feature or consequence. 
Webster's II, New Riverside Dictionary, at 642 (1988). Under that 
plain meaning, Preece's rule 65B petition involves a first-degree 
felony. However frustrated Preece may have been with the Board's 
purported lack of explanation, his first-degree felony conviction 
was an essential component of the Board's decision. (See Addendum 
F). 
Because Preece's petition involved his first-degree felony 
conviction, this Court has original appellate jurisdiction over the 
appeal. Therefore, the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
should be vacated and this case should be considered as if it were 
raised directly from the district court.2 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE BOARD HAS COMPLIED WITH ITS RULES AND GIVEN 
PREECE A WRITTEN EXPLANATION FOR ITS PAROLE DECISION, NO 
FURTHER JUDICIAL RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. THUS, JUDGE 
YOUNG'S ORDER DIRECTING PREECE'S RELEASE FROM PRISON 
SHOULD BE VACATED AND THIS APPEAL DISMISSED AS MOOT. 
Under the mootness doctrine, a court will decline to address 
the merits of the case when the 'requested judicial relief can no 
2
 Of course, if it is determined that this case should be 
reviewed as a direct appeal, then Preece should have been in the 
position of appellee rather than petitioner and the Board of 
Pardons should have been allowed to file the opening brief and 
reply brief. 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
longer affect the rights of .the litigants.' State v. Davis, 721 
P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1986) (quoting Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166, 
168 (Utah 1981); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah 
App. 1990) (appeal is moot if there is no remaining controversy 
between the parties). Preece's claim for relief is moot because 
the courts are constitutionally and statutorily unable to provide 
him with any additional relief over and above that which the Board 
has already given through its written explanation of April 13, 
1993. The constitutionally exclusive nature of the Board's power 
to grant early release will be discussed in Point III. In Point 
IV, the respondents will argue that the Utah sentencing and release 
guidelines do not create an expectancy of release; therefore, the 
guidelines do not provide a court separate authority to order 
release. 
Because Preece has already received the only relief to which 
he would be entitled even if he could establish that the Board's 
failure to explain its parole decision constituted a procedural due 
process violation, this Court must vacate Judge Young's order of 
release and dismiss this appeal. 
If a case becomes moot after a timely appeal has 
been filed from a lower court order . . . that order 
should not be left standing to affect subsequent 
proceedings or rights of the parties. 13 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 292-94 
(1974). . . . [T]he appropriate action for an appellate 
court is to vacate the order of the lower court and 
remand the case with instructions to dismiss. 
Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Assocs., 646 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1982). 
13 
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POINT III 
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATE STATUTES VEST IN THE BOARD OF 
PARDONS THE EXCLUSIVE POWER TO GRANT EARLY RELEASE; 
THEREFORE THE COURTS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE AN 
INMATE AND JUDGE YOUNG'S ORDER WAS ILLEGAL, BEING IN 
EXCESS OF HIS AUTHORITY AND A VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION 
OF POWERS CLAUSE. 
This Court has recognized several times that only the Board of 
Pardons can terminate an inmate's sentence prior to its statutory 
expiration. State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) ("This 
Court has consistently held that the power to reduce or terminate 
sentences is exclusive with the Board."); Foote v. Utah Board of 
Pardons, 808 P. 2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) (under Utah's indeterminate 
sentencing system, actual number of years spent in prison left to 
the "unfettered discretion of the board of pardons. . . . " ) ; see 
also Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App.), (discretion 
to give credit for time served lies solely with the Board) cert. 
granted, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah'1992). 
Here, the district court acted in direct opposition to these 
clear and consistent statements of the law, usurping the Board's 
proper authority and exceeding its jurisdiction. In his order, 
Judge Young found that the Board's action, in failing to release 
Preece in slavish accordance with the guidelines or to explain its 
deviation therefrom violated both due process and the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause. Though Judge Young's reasoning is 
unclear on this point, it is apparently on this basis that the 
court believed it could order Preece released from custody. Even 
14 
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if the Board had not only violated its own rules but also the 
constitution, this violation would not give the court the authority 
to also violate the separation of powers clause of the Utah 
constitution and infringe upon the Board's sole power to grant 
parole. In his brief, Preece attempts to support the district 
court order by arguing that the courts may release an inmate as a 
remedy to correct inappropriate or erroneous conduct. Brief of 
Petitioner, at 35. The federal cases that Preece cites, however, 
actually support respondents' position. In each of those cases, 
the courts first remanded the case to the federal parole commission 
and then stated that if the parole commission refused or failed to 
comply, then the district court could grant the writ and order 
release. Preece's case is unlike those, however, because Judge 
Young never ordered the Board to take any action; therefore, the 
Board never failed to comply with a court order. 
The court's decision in Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 
(3rd Cir. 1988), which Preece cites in support of his claim, also 
contradicts Preece's reasoning and directly supports respondents' 
argument. In Marshall, the district court issued an order very 
similar to Judge Young's. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
described it: "In light of the protracted history of the case and 
the court's impression that the [Parole] Commission would continue 
to evade the court's mandate, the [district] court declined to 
remand [to the Parole Commission] for further explanation." Id. at 
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I 
93 9. Instead the district court granted the writ and ordered 
immediate release. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the order granting 
the writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, the court stated that the 
district court's remedy, i.e. release, was excessive and that an 
appropriate remedy "would be a remand to the Parole Commission for 
an explanation of its decision." Id. at 950. This set of facts is 
similar to Preece. Even though in this case, the trial court never 
ordered the Board to provide an explanation, the tenor of the 
court's comments at the November 2, 1992 hearing erroneously 
present the Board as having wilfully disobeyed a court mandate.3 
Like the district court's order in Marshall, Judge Young's 
order granting the writ of habeas corpus also was excessive. Not 
only does the order exceed the trial court's authority, but it does 
not make logical sense because the punishment, so to speak, does 
3
 In fact, the trial court never entered an order instructing 
the Board to take any action whatsoever. The Board's rehearing was 
held upon the recommendation of its attorney and was not initiated 
by the court. The July 20, 1992 hearing before the trial court 
shows that the court was not ordering the Board to take an action 
but was acting in response t.o the Board. As Judge Young stated: 
"In order to determine whether to grant the writ or dismiss the 
case I think we ought to let the Board of Pardons decide what they 
want to do in terms of taking their own action first." (R. 130). 
Thus, the trial court's later decision to grant the writ was 
not the result of the Board's noncompliance with a court order 
because no such order was ever made. It appears instead, that the 
order resulted from the trial court's disagreement with the Board's 
discretionary decision. Because the Board did not, in fact, 
disobey a court order, the cases Preece cites are not analogous to 
his situation. 
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not fit the crime. At the November 2, 1992 hearing, the only issue 
before the court was the Board's purported failure to explain its 
decision. That failure did not magically erase Preece's three 
convictions and satisfy his debt to society. At most, it imposed 
on obligation on the Board to provide the missing explanation.4 
However, rather than order the Board to fully comply with its 
administrative rules, the trial court chose to stand in the shoes 
of the Board and release Preece on its own initiative. This action 
not only contradicted numerous cases from this Court but also 
violated state statute and the state constitution. 
In Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3), the legislature has determined 
that decisions of the Board of Pardons are final and are not 
subject to judicial review. Although this Court in Foote v. Utah 
Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991), interpreted that 
provision to allow review by extraordinary writ, that review has 
been limited to reviewing and remedying procedural due process 
violations. Foote, 808 P.2d at 735 (number of years actually spent 
in prison left to "unfettered discretion11 of the Board of Pardons) ; 
see also Northern, 825 P. 2d at 698 (Utah App.) (substantive 
decisions of the Board of Pardons are unreviewable). cert, granted, 
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
4
 Ironically, by essentially nullifying the Board's order 
granting early release to Preece on October 10, 1994, the trial 
court actually brought Preece's full five-to-life sentence back 
into full force and effect. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-4 (1992). 
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Even though Preece's claim may allege a procedural due process 
violation for the Board's failure to follow its own ruling 
requiring an explanation of its parole decision, subsection 77-27-
5(3) does not allow a substantive remedy, such as release, for that 
violation. Were the courts able to alter or usurp the Board's 
essential substantive decision-making function on the pretext of a 
procedural due process violation, then not only subsection 77-27-
5(3) but also two provisions of the state constitution, relating to 
the separation of powers and the Board of Pardons, would be 
rendered meaningless. The appropriate remedy for a procedural due 
process violation is not a -substantive remedy but a procedural 
remedy --an order to the Board to comply with correct procedure. 
The unreviewability of the Board's substantive parole 
decisions is not just a creature of the legislature. It is instead 
mandated by the interplay of two separate provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. Article VII, section 12 specifically creates a Board 
of Pardons and Parole to make these substantive decisions about 
parole. Article V explicitly divides the powers of the government 
into three distinct departments and prohibits one of those 
departments from exercising functions appertaining to another. 
The trial court's holding in the instant case is in direct 
contradiction to the constitutional delegation of authority, prior 
Utah decisions, and the historical purposes and functions of the 
Board of Pardons. The people, of this state have given the Board of 
Pardons, not the courts, the constitutional authority to determine 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
whether an inmate has been rehabilitated sufficiently to be 
entitled to parole. The separation of powers clause prohibits any 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one branch from exercising a function appertaining to another. The 
trial courts are a part of the judicial branch, created in Article 
VIII of the constitution; the Board of Pardons is a part of the 
executive branch, created in Article VII. When it released Preece 
from custody, the trial court usurped the executive authority of 
the Board of Pardons and violated the constitution. See Kimball v. 
Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1 (1899) (delegation of power 
to one branch implies inhibition against its exercise by another 
branch). 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH SENTENCING AND RELEASE GUIDELINES DO NOT REQUIRE 
THE BOARD EITHER TO RELEASE PREECE AT A DATE CALCULATED 
PURSUANT TO THE GUIDELINES OR WITH A WRITTEN EXPLANATION 
SETTING FORTH ITS REASONS FOR GOING OVER THE GUIDELINES. 
Preece relies on federal case precedent for the proposition 
that Utah's Sentencing and Release Guidelines create a liberty 
interest protected by the due process clause. This reliance is 
misplaced. Those federal cases simply are not on point because 
they interpret a federal statute that required the United States 
Parole Commission to either follow them or state, in writing, why 
they should not apply. 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (repealed 1987).5 Whereas 
5
 Although the laws relating to the United States Parole 
Commission were technically repealed in 1987, they continue in 
effect for any prisoners sentenced before November 1, 1987. Pulver 
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the Utah Court of Appeals previously has held that Utah's 
guidelines do not create a liberty interest, Hall v. Board of 
Pardons, 806 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah App. 1991), the federal sentencing 
and release guidelines did create a liberty interest. Solomon v. 
Elsea, 676 F.2d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1982); Evans v. Dillahunty, 662 
F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1981). 
In Hall, the Utah Court of Appeals directly addressed the 
question of whether the sentencing and release guidelines created 
a protected liberty interest. After examining the nature of the 
guidelines, that court determined that the guidelines did not, in 
fact, create a liberty interest. The Hall decision was binding on 
Judge Young, but he ignored it. The guidelines are not law, but 
are, instead, a cooperative venture between criminal justice 
agencies. As directed by Utah Code Ann. § 63-25-4 (1990), the 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice adopted the guidelines 
in 1985. Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines, Appendix D Utah 
Court Rules Ann. 1128 (1993) . The guidelines have not been adopted 
by the Legislature as law, nor has the Utah Supreme Court made them 
mandatory for the courts. 
Indeed, the guidelines themselves state that they are not 
"intended to set policy in concrete" and that "[n]o additional 
legislation is being proposed to coerce agencies to conform." id. 
at 1130. This is far different from the statutory language in 18 
v. Brennan, 912 F.2d 894, 895 n.l (7th Cir. 1987). 
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U.S.C. § 4206 which required the United States Parole Commission to 
follow the guidelines absent good cause. The Court of Appeals in 
Hall correctly concluded that the guidelines did not create a 
liberty interest. The Michigan sentencing guidelines, which are 
similarly of an advisory nature, also have been construed to not 
create a liberty interest. Thomas v. Foltz, 654 F. Supp. 105, 107 
(E.D. Mich. 1987). 
The Michigan Supreme Court issued the guidelines in an 
administrative order and invited, but did not require, their use. 
Thomas, 654 F. Supp. at 107. Even though the Michigan Supreme 
Court later made consideration of the guidelines mandatory upon 
sentencing judges, they were still free to go above the guidelines 
if they specified the reason: "Adherence to the guidelines is 
wholly discretionary; the Supreme Court asks that sentencing judges 
explain their deviations only to improve the guidelines 
themselves." Id. Further, the Thomas court held that a sentencing 
judge was not required to explain to the criminal defendant why it 
was deviating from the guidelines. Id. 
Similarly, at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1993), Utah 
courts are required to consider the sentencing guidelines but are 
not required to abide by them or explain their reasons for going 
above them. No statute imposes an obligation upon the Board of 
Pardons to even consider the guidelines. Taken to its logical 
extreme, Preece's argument that these advisory guidelines be given 
the status of constitutional commandments undercuts efforts to 
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establish uniformity and consistency in the criminal justice 
system. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Hewitt v. 
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1982): 
The creation of procedural guidelines to channel the 
decision-making of prison officials is, in the view of 
many experts in the field, a salutary development. It 
would be ironic to hold that when a State embarks on such 
desirable experimentation it thereby opens the door to 
scrutiny . . . while States that choose not to adopt such 
procedural provisions entirely avoid the strictures of 
the Due Process Clause. 
The Court of Appeals was correct when it stated in Hall that 
the guidelines are not "mandatory standards which must be followed 
but merely guidelines used to clarify the Board's exercise of 
discretion without altering any of the existing considerations for 
parole release." Hall, 806 P.,2d at 218. Preece simply did not 
have any right to expect that the guidelines would be applied or 
that he would be given an explanation particularly stating why the 
guidelines date was not chosen. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully request 
the following relief. If this Court finds that the April 13, 1993 
written explanation from the Board mooted this appeal, then Judge 
Young's order must be vacated and this appeal dismissed. In the 
alternative, this Court must reverse Judge Young's order granting 
the writ and releasing Preece from prison. 
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ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
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Sec. 12. [Board of Pardons and Parole - Appointment - Powers and procedures - Governor's 
powers and duties - Legislature's powers.] 
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The Governor shall appoint the 
members of the board with the consent of the Senate. The terms of office shall be as provided 
by statute. 
(2) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote and upon other conditions as 
provided by statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures and restitution orders, commute 
punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases except treason and impeachments, 
subject to regulations as provided by statute. 
(b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may not be remitted and a commutation, parole, 
or pardon may not be granted except after a full hearing before the board, in open session, and 
after previous notice of the time and place of the hearing has been given. 
(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board, the reasons therefor in each case, and the 
dissent of any member who may disagree shall be recorded and filed as provided by statute with 
all papers used upon the hearing. 
(3) (a) The Governor may grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convictions for offenses 
against the state except treason or conviction on impeachment. These respites or reprieves may 
not extend beyond the next session of the board. At that session, the board shall continue or 
determine the respite or reprieve, commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as provided 
in this section. 
(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor may suspend execution of the sentence 
until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next annual general session, when the 
Legislature shall pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its execution. If the Legislature takes 
no action on the case before adjournment of that session, the sentence shall be executed. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
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PAROLE 18USCS§4206 
§4206. Parole determination criteria [Repealed, but see other 
provisions note for continuation] 
(a) If an eligible prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the 
institution or institutions to which he has been confined, and if the 
Commission, upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner, determines: 
(1) that release would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or 
promote disrespect for the law; and 
(2) that release would not jeopardize the public welfare; subject to the 
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, and pursuant to 
guidelines promulgated by the Commission pursuant to section 
4203(aXl)t such prisoner shall be released 
(b) The Commission shall furnish the eligible prisoner with a written notice 
of its determination not later than twenty-one days, excluding holidays, 
after the date of the parole determination proceeding. If parole is denied 
such notice shall state with particularity the reasons for such denial 
(c) The Commission may grant or deny release on parole notwithstanding 
the guidelines referred to in subsection (a) of this section if it determines 
there is good cause for so doing: Provided, That the prisoner is furnished 
written notice stating with particularity the reasons for its determination, 
including a summary of the information relied upon. 
(d) Any prisoner, serving a sentence of five years or longer, who is not 
earlier released under this section or any other applicable provision of law, 
shall be released on parole after having served two-thirds of each consecu-
tive term or terms, or after serving thirty years of each consecutive term or 
terms of more than forty-five years including any life term, whichever is 
earlien Provided, however, That the Commission shall not release such 
prisoner if it determines that he has seriously or frequently violated 
institution rules and regulations or that there is a reasonable probability 
that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime. 
(Added March 15, 1976, P. L. 94-233, § 2, 90 Stat 223.) 
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63-25-4. Duties of commission. 
The state commission on criminal and juvenile justice administration shall: 
(1) promote the coordination of all criminal and juvenile justice agencies; 
(2) provide analysis and recommendations on all criminal and juvenile justice legislation, 
state budget, and facility requests, including program and fiscal impact on all components of the 
criminal and juvenile justice system; 
(3) provide analysis, accountability, recommendations, and supervision for federal criminal 
justice grant monies; 
(4) provide public information on the criminal and juvenile justice system and give technical 
assistance to agencies or local units of government on methods to promote public awareness; 
(5) promote research and program evaluation as an integral part of the criminal and juvenile 
justice system; 
(6) provide a comprehensive criminal justice plan annually, that includes a strategic plan 
for the efficient management of information resources; 
(7) develop, monitor, and evaluate sentencing and release guidelines for adults and 
juveniles; 
(8) forecast future demands on the criminal justice system, including specific projections 
for secure bed space; and 
(9) promote the development of criminal and juvenile justice information systems that are 
consistent with common standards for data storage and are capable of appropriately sharing 
information with other criminal justice information systems by: 
(a) developing and maintaining common data standards for use by all state criminal justice 
agencies; 
(b) annually performing audits of criminal history record information maintained by state 
criminal justice agencies to assess their accuracy, completeness, and adherence to standards; 
(c) defining and developing state and local programs and projects associated with the 
improvement of information management for law enforcement and the administration of justice; 
and 
(d) establishing general policies concerning criminal justice information systems and 
making rules as necessary to carry out the duties under this subsection and Subsection (6). 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
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76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed - Civil penalties - Restitution - Hearing 
- Definitions - Resentencing - Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with mandatory sentences. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical 
expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition 
or transportation. 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person adjudged 
guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or 
victims of the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, or to the victim of any other 
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court. 
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(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria 
in Subsection (c). 
(b) (i) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the 
county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity 
for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria 
in Subsection (c). 
(c) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution that is complete, partial, 
or nominal under this subsection, the court shall take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method 
of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) (i) When the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this 
subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) The court shall send a copy of its order of restitution to the Division of Finance. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the 
court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the 
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation 
expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear warrant 
issued for an infraction; 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (a)(i) shall be 
calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (i) applies to each defendant transported 
regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated 
minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of middle severity 
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in 
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writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior 
to the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or 
lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other 
reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or 
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced 
at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the 
upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding 
aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been sentenced and committed to the 
Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion, 
or at any time upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and 
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if he had 
not previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no greater than the initial sentence 
nor less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute. 
(ii) The resentencing provided for in this section shall take into consideration the 
sentencing guidelines established under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile 
Justice to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. 
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served. 
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the record at the time of 
sentencing. 
(ii) The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the sentence that if the defendant 
is released from prison he may be on parole for a period of ten years. 
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape of a child, 
object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes 
substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the information or 
indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant 
shall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This subsection takes 
precedence over any conflicting provision of law. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
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77-18-4. Sentence - Term - Construction. 
Whenever a person is convicted of a crime and the judgment provides for a commitment to 
the state prison, the court shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment unless otherwise provided 
by law. The sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for an indeterminate term of not 
less than the minimum and not to exceed the maximum term provided by law for the particular 
crime. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, every sentence, regardless of its form 
or terms, which purports to be for a shorter or different period of time, shall be construed to 
be a sentence for the term between the minimum and maximum periods of time provided by law 
and shall continue until the maximum period has been reached unless sooner terminated or 
commuted by authority of the Board of Pardons. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
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77-27-5. Board of Pardons authority. 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons shall determine by majority decision when and under what 
conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state, persons committed to serve 
sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities which are under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or 
impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution 
ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or 
terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The chairperson shall 
appoint members to the panels in any combination and in accordance with rules promulgated by 
the board, except in hearings involving commutation and pardons. The chairperson may 
participate on any panel and when doing so is chairperson of the panel. The chairperson of the 
board may designate the chairperson for any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution remitted, no parole, 
pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated, except after a full hearing before the 
board or the board's appointed examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection 
other than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing before the board. 
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole revocation 
hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be given to the defendant, 
the county or district attorney's office responsible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing 
court, law enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and 
whenever possible, the victim or the victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include information provided 
in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by the board under that section. This 
information shall be provided in terms that are reasonable for the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations 
or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not 
subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a 
civil judgment. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the governor's power 
to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for offenses against the state, except 
treason or conviction on impeachment. However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond 
the next session of the Board of Pardons and the board, at that session, shall continue or 
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as 
provided. In the case of conviction for treason, the governor may suspend execution of the 
sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall 
then either pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders serving sentences may 
be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have their fines or forfeitures remitted, or 
their sentences commuted or terminated, the Board of Pardons shall consider whether the persons 
have made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with the standards 
and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or 
forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence. 
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78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified 
by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority 
to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees 
or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment 
by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States 
or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which 
the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record 
involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and 
(e) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of 
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review 
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its 
review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified 
by a court of the United States. 
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(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which 
the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record 
involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and 
(e) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of 
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review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments., orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the 
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims department of a 
circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court: of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
•$ incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions 
of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited 
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the 
court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in 
its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
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Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, 
a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in 
paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of 
wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or 
corporate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and the 
failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ. The procedures in this 
rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule 
does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be 
governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment. 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state prison, other 
correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the commitment resulted from a substantial 
denial of rights may petition the court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall 
govern proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and commitments for 
violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not govern proceedings based on claims 
relating to the terms or conditions of confinement. 
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the proceeding 
shall be commenced by filing a petition, together with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the 
district court in the county in which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The 
court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or 
witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings shall be commenced by filing a 
petition together with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in which 
the petitioner is located. 
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in 
relation to the legality of the commitment. Additional claims relating to the legality of the 
commitment may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The 
petition shall state: 
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained; 
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the 
dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number 
for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner; 
(C) in plain and concise terms, alt of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner claims 
a substantial violation of rights as the result of the commitment; 
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(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment for violation of 
probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and caption or title of 
the appellate proceeding and the results of the review; 
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adjudicated in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so the reasons for the denial of relief in the 
prior proceeding. 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the petition affidavits, copies 
of records or other evidence available to the petitioner in support of the allegations. The 
petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any 
prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the commitment, 
and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, 
and memoranda are not attached, the petition shall state why they are not attached. 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or 
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two 
copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly 
deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole 
violation proceedings, the presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge 
who issued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court 
that the issues presented in the petition have already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or 
if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall 
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face. The 
order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the 
entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. 
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part 
of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court shall designate the portions of the petition 
that are not frivolous and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any 
memorandum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney. 
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed under these rules for 
service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the attorney general and county 
attorney, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or 
county attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not 
been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance 
with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days (plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any 
2 
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motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the 
motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court. 
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for 
a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion for good cause, the court may grant 
leave to either party to take discovery or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, 
the court may order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant transcript 
or court records. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not 
be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall 
be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present 
in court during the proceeding. 
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order 
with respect to the validity of the challenged commitment and with respect to rearraignment, 
retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any hearing on a 
dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general or the county attorney, or upon its 
own motion, the court may stay release of the petitioner pending appeal of its order. 
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), 
to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the 
proceeding, the petitioner may proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the 
court may direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was originally 
charged. 
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and 
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes 
governing appeals to those courts. 
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule, this paragraph (c) 
shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal 
liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk 
of the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in 
which the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a short, plain 
statement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the 
respondent and the place where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of 
the restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has 
already been, adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in 
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the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the 
petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the 
pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the 
restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or 
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two 
copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court 
that the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any 
other reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith 
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons 
for this conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order 
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry 
of the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous on its face, the 
{
 court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any 
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order 
directing the respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within 
which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an 
order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the 
restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the 
person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so restrained has been transferred to 
any other person, and if so, the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason 
or authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to prohibit the court 
from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive motion. 
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed 
from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing 
order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the 
respondent before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the 
petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of such 
other persons as may be appropriate. 
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it 
appears that a person other than the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be 
restrained, the hearing order and any other process issued by the court may be served on the 
person having custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been named 
as respondent in the action. 
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of the person alleged to 
be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the person 
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from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The 
sheriff shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to 
law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court 
shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The 
respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained 
or shall state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent 
to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right to be 
present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order 
shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the petition, 
if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent. 
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, and when directed to 
do so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this 
paragraph (d). Any person who is not required to be represented by the attorney general and 
who is aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this 
paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph (d) if (A) the person claims to be 
entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a 
petition under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by a 
person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be brought in the name of the 
petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay 
any judgment for costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the 
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate, relief may be granted: (A) where a person usurps, 
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a 
franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where 
a public officer does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where 
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where 
any corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or 
renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate 
rights, privileges or franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice 
be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order 
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant 
temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
5 
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(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty. 
{ 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by any of the * 
acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person < 
has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or (C) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use 
or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice \ 
be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order 
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the 
inferior court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent 
to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant 
temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. , 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's 
review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued 
its authority. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
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R671-305-1. Notification of Board's Decision. 
The offender will be notified verbally at the conclusion of the hearing of the action taken 
or that the Board has taken the matter under advisement. 
The decision of the Board shall be reduced to writing, including the rationale for the 
decision. Copies of the written decision are given to the offender, the institution and Field 
Operations. The Board shall publish written results of Board meetings, in minute form. Copies 
of minutes shall be kept on permanent file in the Board office. 
(c) 1990, 1991, 1993 By The Michie Company 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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PER CURIAM: 
This case is before the court on respondents' motion for a 
stay pending appeal of an order granting a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus and ordering the release of petitioner Robert D. 
Preece forthwith. In addition to opposing the stay, petitioner 
has moved this court for summary disposition of the appeal. In 
the interest of expediting a decision in this case, we deem it 
appropriate to address the merits of the appeal at this time. 
See Rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse the 
order of the district court, in part, andjremand-for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
The complaint filed by petitioner in the district court 
challenged the determination of his parole date by the Board of 
Pardons. The order of the trial court recites that the Board 
applied an internal guideline of 147 months in determining 
petitioner's release date of October 10, 1994. The Board 
subsequently learned that the actual guideline for the offenses 
was 111 months. Under that guideline, petitioner would have been 
entitled to release on parole on October 10, 1991. The district 
court continued proceedings on the petition to allow the Board 
"to correct the error or explain their reasons for deviating from 
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the guidelines." The Board held a special attention hearing and 
reaffirmed the release date at 147 months for October 10, 1994, 
without providing any written explanation for its decision, as 
required by its own internal rules. See R671-305-2, Utah 
Administrative Code (1992). 
Based upon the preceding facts, the trial court granted the 
petition and ordered petitioner's release "forthwith," stating: 
This court finds that under the circumstance 
of the error made as to the guidelines 
discussed with Petitioner that the Petitioner 
is entitled to an explanation of the error 
which the Board refuses to do. Further, due 
process requires fair process and a 
Petitioner is entitled to an explanation of 
why the error should be ignored and the 
longer term served. It is cruel and unusual 
punishment to do otherwise. The Petitioner 
has been denied due process and is being 
treated to cruel and unusual punishment when 
no correction or explanation is given as to 
the mistake and as to the time to be served 
by the Petitioner. 
Respondents contend that the trial court exceeded its 
authority in ordering the release of the petitioner as a remedy 
for the due process violation found by the court, and that the 
court should have proceeded in accordance with Rule 65B(e), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65B(e)(2)(B) provides that relief 
may be granted "where an inferior court, administrative agency, 
corporation or person has failed to perform an act required by 
law as a duty of office, trust or station." Respondents, 
accordingly, contend that the petition is not a proper petition 
for "wrongful imprisonment" under Rule 65B(b) because it is not a 
challenge to the validity of the original commitment, and because 
petitioner is serving a valid sentence that has not been set 
aside on by any court on appeal or otherwise. 
Although we agree that the petitioner was entitled to a 
written explanation of the parole determination following the 
special attention hearing, we hold that the district court 
exceeded its authority in ordering the unconditional release of 
petitioner based upon the failure of the Board to comply with the 
prior orders of the court and its own procedural rules. Under 
our indeterminate sentencing system, the authority to determine 
parole dates is vested in the Board of Pardons. See Foote v. 
Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). While parole 
decisions are subject to habeas corpus review under Foote, this 
court has previously held that the scope of review is limited to 
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a review of procedural due process and does not extend authority 
for judicial review of the "reasonableness of the parole 
decision", which is not subject to judicial review under Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (Supp. 1992). Northern v. Barnes. 825 P.2d 
696, 699 (Utah App. 1992). We conclude that the appropriate 
remedy for the procedural due process violation found by the 
district court in this case is to require the Board expeditiously 
to provide the district court and petitioner with a written 
explanation of its reasons for the parole decision. See also 
R671-305-2, Utah Administrative Code (1992). To the extent that 
the district court's ruling is based upon a determination that 
the Board's guidelines are mandatory, that conclusion is an 
incorrect statement of the law under State v. Hall. 806 P.2d 217, 
218 (Utah App. 1991). 
The order of the district court is reversed insofar as it 
provides for unconditional release of petitioner from the custody 
of the Department of Corrections. The case is remanded to the 
district court with instructions to treat the petition under Rule 
65B(e). 
fegnal W. Garff, Judge 
w I, the undersigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals do hereby oerttfy that the foregoing is a full, true anc 
correct copy of an original document on file in the Utaf 
Court of Appeals. In testimony whereof, I have set my 
hand and affixed the seal of the Cour 
Court 
Date 
ity Clerk ^ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PREECE, ROBERT D 
VS 
PLAINTIFF 
HOUSE, TOM 
UTAH DEPT OF CORRECT DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 920902447 HC 
DATE 11/02/92 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
COURT REPORTER EILEEN AMBORSE 
COURT CLERK CLP 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
HABEAS CORPUS WRIT 
P. ATTY. PREECE, ROBERT D PRO SE 
D. ATTY. BEADLES, JAMES;MILLER, LORENZO 
SWORN AND EXAMINED 
OTHERS: TORGESON, KIRK 
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS COMES 
BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING, WITH APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE. 
BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH THE PLAINTIFF PRO SE AND DEFEND-
ANT'S COUNSEL, THE COURT ORDERS PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINT-
MENT OF COUNSEL IS DENIED. THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS PLAINTIFF'S 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS GRANTED AS READ INTO THE RECORD 
AND i; PAINTJET IS TO BE RELEASED FROM THE UTAH STATE PRISON 
FORTHWITH. 
THE WRIT IS GRANTED BASED, IN PART, ON STIPULATED FACTS AS 
FOLLOWS: (1) PETITIONER WAS HEARD BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDON 
BY APPEARING BEFORE HEATHER COOKE IN MAY OF 1991. AT THAT TIME, 
MS. COOKE RECOMMENDED THAT MR. PREECE BE RELEASED IN MAY OF 
1993. SHE DISCUSSED WITH MR. PREECE THAT THE TIME GUIDELINES 
RECOMMENDED 12 1/2 YEARS. THE RECOMMENDATION OF MS. COOKE WAS 
THEN CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD AS A GROUP AND THEY DETERMINED NOT 
TO FOLLOW MS. COOKE'S RECOMMENDATION BUT ORDERED RELEASE OCTOBER 
10, 1994. THAT DATE WAS EXACTLY 12 1/2 YEARS OR CONSISTENT WITH 
THEIR GUIDELINES. (2) THEREAFTER, IT WAS LEARNED THAT THE 
BOARD'S ACTUAL GUIDELINE AT THAT TIME WAS 9 1/2 YEARS RATHER 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
THAN 12 1/2 AS THEY HAD THOUGHT. UNDER THAT GUIDELINE THE 
PETITIONER WOULD HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO RELEASE OCTOBER 10, 1991. 
(3) REALIZING THAT THE BOARD OF PARDONS HAD NOT HAD THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT THE ERROR OR EXPLAIN THEIR REASONS FOR 
DEVIATING FROM THE GUIDELINES, THE COURT CONTINUED THE PETITION 
FOR A WRIT SEVERAL TIMES. THE BOARD HELD A "SPECIAL ATTENTION" 
HEARING AND WITHOUT EXPLANATION OF THE ERROR AND EXPLANATION 
OF THE REASON TO DEVIATE FROM THEIR GUIDELINES THEY AFFIRMED THE 
RELEASE DATE AT 12 1/2 YEARS. 
THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN 
EXPLANATION OF THE ERROR WHICH THE BOARD REFUSES TO DO. FURTHER 
DUE PROCESS REQUIRES FAIR PROCESS AND A PETITIONER IS ENTITLED 
TO AN EXPLANATION OF WHY THE ERROR SHOULD BE IGNORED AND THE 
LONGER TERM SERVED. IT IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT TO DO 
OTHEREWISE. THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS AND HAS 
BEEN TREATED TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT WHEN NO CORRECTION 
OR EXPLANATION IS GIVEN AS TO 
SERVED BY THE PETITIONER. 
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT 
APPEAL. THE MOTION IS DENIED. 
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"bet 
PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Utah Attorney General 
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250) 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
6100 South 300 East, Suite 204 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 265-5638 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. PREECE, s 
Petitioner, : 
V. ! 
TOM HOUSE, et al., i 
Respondents. i 
: ORDER 
: Case No. 920902447 
: Hon. David Young 
Petitioner's complaint for extraordinary relief came before 
this court on November 2, 1992 for hearing. Petitioner represented 
himself; the Respondents were represented by James H. Beadles, 
Special Assistant Attorney General, and Lorenzo Miller, Assistant 
Attorney General. Based on discussion with the Petitioner pro se, 
counsel for Respondents and a review of the pleadings, I make the 
following order: 
1. Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel is denied; 
2. Petitioner's writ for habeas corpus is granted and he is 
ordered released from the custody of the Utah State Prison 
forthwith. 
3. Respondent's motion to stay pending appeal is denied. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
f ( 
As stated in the minute entry prepared and signed by this 
court on November 2, 1992, this order is based on the following 
stipulated facts: 
1. Petitioner was heard before the Board of Pardons by 
appearing before Heather Cook on May 31, 1991. At that time, Ms. 
Cook recommended that Mr. Preece be released on May 11, 1993. She 
discussed with Mr. Preece that the time guidelines recommended 147 
months (12 years, three months). The recommendation of Ms. Cook 
was then considered by the Board as a group and they determined not 
to follow Ms. Cook's recommendation but ordered release for October 
10, 1994. That date was exactly 147 months, consistent with the 
guidelines. 
2. Thereafter, it was learned that the Board's actual 
guideline at that time was 111 months (9 years, three months) 
rather than the 147 months they had thought. Under that guideline 
the Petitioner would have been entitled to release October 10, 
1991. 
3. Realizing that the Board of Pardons had not had the 
opportunity to correct the error or explain their reasons for 
deviating from the guidelines, the court continued the petition for 
a writ several times. The Board held a "special attention" hearing 
and without explanation of the error and explanation of the reason 
or reasons to deviate from the guidelines they simply re-affirmed 
the release date at 147 months for October 10, 1994. 
2 
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4. This court finds that under the circumstance of the error 
made as to the guidelines discussed with Petitioner that the 
Petitioner is entitled to an explanation of the error which the 
Board refuses to do. Further, due process requires fair process 
and a Petitioner is entitled to an explanation of why the error 
should be ignored and the longer term served. It is cruel and 
unusual punishment to do otherwise. The Petitioner has been denied 
due process and is being treated to cruel and unusual punishment 
when no correction or explanation is given as to the mistake and as 
to the time to be served by the Petitioner. 
DATED this «!? day of November 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
3 
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JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2525 
Telephone: (801) 575-1600 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. PREECE, 
Petitioner, 
TOM HOUSE, Warden, 
PETE HAUN, Chairman of the 
Board of Pardons, HEATHER 
COOK, Member of the Board of 
Pardons, and other individual 
members of the Board of Pardons 
whose identities are 
presently unknown, 
Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
PATRICIA L. NEELEY 
Case No. 92065 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ss, 
I, PATRICIA L. NEELEY, under oath state the following to be 
true and correct to the best of my knowledge: 
1. I am a citizen and resident of the United States of 
America and the State of Utah, and I am over the age of eighteen 
(18) years. 
2. I am employed by the State of Utah as the Support Service 
Specialist Supervisor for the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, and 
I have custody of the Board's business records. 
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3. The documents attached to this affidavit, labeled Exhibits 
1 and 2, are true and correct copies of records kept in the Board's 
file on Robert Douglas Preece, USP# 15903. 
4. The original documents are used in and maintained as part 
of the Board's ordinary course of business activity and are 
compiled at or near the time and place of the events contained 
therein. 
•tA 
Dated this ^  day of "TO^ X>^ \vv^  M , v / 1993. 
PATRICIA L. NEELEY^- \ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this _^L day of fOo\)ewb^f 199.J. 
s» i*» M ?^» Am *m p»p» m 
tloliry Pub!:^  I 
JANET L LITTLE S Q 236 State Capitol B 
IZJ Salt Lake City, Utah 841 r J My Commission Expires I 
August 15,1995 I 
State of Utah ! 
My Commission Expires: 
FARY PUBMCi 
esiding at ^ ^ A ^ C ^ ^ ^ 
2 
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r \ 
Michael O. Leavltt 
Governor 
Michael R. Sibbett 
Chairman 
w*z& 
Members 
Donald E. Blanchard 
H.L (Pete) Haun 
Curtis L Garner 
Cheryl Hansen 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the case of Robert Douglas Preece, USP# 15903, the Board of Pardons issues the 
following statement of clarification for its decision to grant a parole date of October 4 1 , 
1994. 
Mr. Preece last appeared before the Board for a Special Attention Hearing on September 18, 
1992. At that hearing his case was reviewed and he was given the opportunity to present 
information for a reconsideration of his previously set parole date of October 11, 1994. A 
decision was not made at that hearing and the case was taken under advisement for staffing 
review with the Board. The staffing review was subsequently completed and on October 6, 
1992, the decision of the Board was issued in writing, (see copy attached). A written 
statement of the Board's rationale for this decision was also issued and copies of each 
forwarded to Mr. Preece. (see copy attached). 
The Board hereby reiterates the same rationale for its decision as provided to Mr. Preece in 
writing on October 6, 1992. 
1) The violent nature of the crimes for which Mr. Preece was convicted and is presently 
incarcerated. 
2) After Mr. Preece's conviction and commitment for two counts of Aggravated Robbery 
and while still incarcerated, he was convicted of the new offense of Manslaughter; 
3) The length of Mr. Preece's sentences, two five to life sentences for Aggravated Robbery 
and a one to fifteen year sentence for Manslaughter (sentences are running concurrently). 
4) The fact that Mr. Preece has only served ten years of incarceration on these sentences. 
5) A serious disciplinary violation that occurred in July, 1991 involving the use of drugs. It 
should be noted that this disciplinary incident occurred after the hearing at which the October, 
1994 parole date was set. This is a serious violation which routinely results in the service of 
additional time. 
For these reasons, the Board of Pardons affirms the present parole date of October 11, 1994 
is appropriate in this case. Mr. Preece has a lengthy juvenile record and when 18 years old 
he was implicated and charged with eleven counts of Aggravated Robbery and subsequently 
plea bargained to two counts. 
Dated this A3 day of April, 1993. 
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Name ^ N ^ * | > y USP fl 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
•ATTHMATJ 
The Board of Pardons' decision in this natter is based primarily, but not 
exclusively, on the following reasons: 
ASSBMAlffiS ttUIfiolIHS 
OTFWWR'S BACKGROUND 
Criaiinal history significantly underepresented by guidelines 
(i.e., stany sere than ft felony convictions and/or 6 misdemeanors) 
„« History of similar offenses 
A . Pattern of increasingly or decreaisingly serious offenses . . . . 
(lft.H\t(J tr History of unsuccessful or successful supervisions 
CIA1ACTKEIST1CB OF T O OFFBBK 
Use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities 
Demonstration of extreme cruelty or depravity 
, Abuse of position of trust, special skill, or responsibility r\ 
j£L Multiple incidents and/or victiiesWAA* Htb^^>y b4-l<HX$J 
Actual cain reacted from the offenafc Jr ' - . . ~ . . * -
JZ 
Actual gain reaped from the oiffenat 
OFFENDER'S HAITB DOLING XEE OFFENSE 
_ ^ Motive (intentional, premeditated it. impuliive, reactionary) . 
j£l Role (organiser, leader yi. follower, minimal participant) . • 
Obetruction of justice yg. early withdrawal or eelf-surrender *. __ 
^ 
TICTIM CHARACTERISTICS 
Extent of injury (physical,, emotional, financial, social) ^ 
Relatively vulnerable victim yg • aggressive or provoking victim L^ 
Victim in position of authority over offender 
OFniCKR'S PRESENT CHARACTERISTICS 
Denial or mitigation Jtfie Complete acceptance of responsibility \r 
Extent of remorse and apparent motivation to rehabilitate • • • 
Timeliness and extent of efforts to pay restitution . . . • * • ^ 
Prison or Parole programming (effort to enroll, etc%) « . • • . LS*^ 
Prison disciplinary problems or other defiance of authority • . 
Employment possibilities (history, skills» current job, future) ^ 
Extent of corwnunity support or community fear, condemnation . . tr 
Nature and stability of release plans , 
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise • • • . • 
Unusual institutional vulnerability (due to age, health, other) 
Exceptional riak to aelf or others • • • « 
OTHER 
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' Ro. B o y zsro 
b 
ffUD 
MAY 0 1 892 
COUNTY 
1 " ^ " T N E - T H X R D J U D X C I L A L a r s r R r c r COUP? or -SAuT L A K E : CQUNrrV , STATE, or UTA H °9PUtyCterk 
s O^ Ube^f D.9, 
VS. Pe>i'4-i'on£.»^, 
6+aA-e_ pv-isar^ V-A.C.F. , 
t>VaVe. Soo,»-d oP P a p o n s , 
He.<yVWe_v- CookJL , /vu-j^b£->-
U-Kk-2+o-te- ^ a ^ d Of ftrdonS, 
1_rv^iVi'^UQ\ n>JLrvsb2-^ S OP +hJL 
L/4-aK^Va-k. &ocvr-<l o f Rl^rbrvS 
vl»-r-h oP Habeas Corpus 
C*se. 4o. £$%&/?? /yC 
I§3£ DAVID S. Yuiiii 
C a o s e - o P QC.A-iOr\ a\\e_q€_S a s P O U O L O S ', 
(^^ Re--V-i4-i0^e.v- is a v-esfAe-rM- oP J4-aK pi-£S€jM-ly 
r e ^ A i o ^ aA- -i-Ke, J f a K .S+a-K. p^iSor^ in CV-apej-, z_TT. 
fc..^ Pe-V»4-ior\e^ fs p»-e_s£.ryHy i'r>co>~s€_^cvred ar\d 
• ^ e s W ^ a oP Ki's LX6EPTN by 4-he above. * narked 
0€_Pej^ AA*M-s o> 4-K€_ U-faK -S+a4-e. prison. 
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j-obtx'-^'y ( ccy , piV-s-V- d^v-e-e. P^_)or^ies inVolVmq 
a se.rvte.nciL oP PiV£_ yeAr-s +o /»'Pe_ sr^p^sonrr\j2_n4-. 
(A.-) . . . 
P&.4-i+-io^e»-- i s pt-e.s^_rvHy /'rvC-c*>-.S€.r-T3f e d a+-
+Ke_ «J4-aK -St-a-te. p^i'son> or* +h€_ basis oP a auiii-sj 
pU_a UJKICLK p-Q_ -^i4-j'o^€_v- e.^ 4--e_h-€-d or^ 6K- abo^/-f-
K/6>/- /O, /Q.<33 , Po — ^ o n e . C o o n + o P MQnSlQuqK4-£r-
Q S-e-cot^d de.q>-«--e.. PeJorvy Mvv/olVmq d 
SexN-Ve-nCLQ^ OP OnJL. +O Pir±£.€-r-\ ye.c\r-S 1 rnpersonrn^Ln4 . 
Pe_4-if»oi^e,K has rr^ad-e_ r>o aHe.mp+ +o appeal 
-^4_ bas»s o P k».s cjuil-fy pla-as r»o>- has pG_-k+fOn£>-
hy-ou^wV any pH-jor- Mabe ls Corpus ach'on af focKina 
VKJL. ConPir\£j-nJ2_n-V- o P - f M _ p€L"K-|-|0 r\€.r- |'n /|*}K+" 
OP Ki-s ^o i i+y pU,aS. 
Pe-Vi"f tOnj2_r- Kas b€_e_r> d-e-nue-d P»-OCXU}L)»-TQ \ 
C\oA SubSVc^ryViN-e. du^ . p -^OCJZ_SS oP 4-KJL LQoO 
<^ua>-ar\+<2.-e.& by 4 -KJL u f o K -S4a-te_ Cons+»+u4/on 
h>\\ 4-KA- d-e.Pe_i^darvhs i«-> H-Ki€_k- qc-4-ic>n>s and 
B E F O R E - AM l i A P A P t x A L AD/VMLNiXSTRATX.\/E. 
TRx.fe i ]NlM. 
TKcvV- Gocv-^ o P P a p o n s i-we-r^b-e^ Wfija+hej*-
COOKIL , Used p€-v-,sc>r^ (\.\ Pa-e_\irs<q Qn>d B ias +Ka i 
\Je.v-e_ K\^|K\y pve^ud»C.»al +0 a Pco> Cmd 
Da+eA |^/Aay 31, flqi ^ WeMHe.*- £ook€_ \rsCorrrse.<\ 
Pe.4-r4-iOrve.w- + K a V -She. h q d beer% p-e.r-SOrs(\\\\J 
aFPe_c4-€_A by +KJL pe.-W-fror\j2_h-s Cw-irrd2.oP /VtanSJQucjh+eir-, 
^ U O ~ C K occ-o^-ed i o ^ " u l y /3$3. 
TKa-\- Mea4-Ke>- (LooKe i r> f"b*-rv\e_d pe.4-.-fior\£_»-
]r\ c\ rvAar\r\JL.v~ - f K ^ V LoC\S 0>~bi"hv-C^y O ^ d 
C a p a c i o u s , -fc-Ka4 SK&, h a d /os4- k£_j- posi-Kor^ 
\ n/>l,\,,-4_;flo n^w-Ai\-N^4-nu. c\4- -hhJL c/4-a.wO 0 0 0 ' ^ ^"» ^ * ^v «% . " • V 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-fft-a-K- p r i s o n , b - e c a o s e . O P -fKQ_ <liKlorr>>S-k^nCQ_S 
5 u r h O u ^ d m q pe_+-i4-|'Orv£L>-*s Cr-innJZ. o P AtanSlauCjh+er . 
f S E E ! £ y K . b i + - - A ^ A P r / d o V , 4 / 'o Suppo>--f o P 
m*A I j v ^pecun Jos i"4-y ) 
(to _ 
"XjsTnELR^ST AMD P R o C E . D U R ^ L AMD S ^ B S T - A A / T ^ E I 
DUE. PROCESS fin&TS y / E R E . V X O L A T E L O QH 
"TiAE. DE . r t . s lOAMTS 
WorNOr-abCo_ Le.oi-NQ.v-d M. Russor^ , ^Tudc^e., TKi'i-d 
^ruc\<c_iQ\ D»'S"h-iC.-f doov-H- , ir\ a ^ d Por- Sc|+ La&L 
Cou^-Vy , S*a+e o P d-t-aK , C q s e AJO. g 9 o q 3 3 g ^ - ^ c • 
The. s-V-a-V-e. QCjH-e.-e.d -f-o e x p o s e pe.-K-f/one.^s 
/ ^ c r ^ - V e . o.iSdjpl ioAv-y repo i -+ "**• 003239 Q^d a n y 
0\nd a ) l re.P€j-e.rVLa_S +o diSC-ipJinqv-y repo r "h 
**-003233
 % P K O O ^ pe.4~i+-ior>e-v-.s p e r s o n P, c&. and 
qvNuoHJL^-e. ebQ-S + H Q - V 5 U C K we.<Lov-d n^ay appeav . 
(£'E.E: CC^-V.*_I^+S , E.*Kibi4- - G ^ 
"TKa-V +-KIL- U + a K De-pav—\-rr>^j^-\- o P C.Crr£C-\- iOnS 
a^<A 4-K-e. J-k\K .S-l-a-te- pv-ison m\ diV-e^_+- vro/Q-Won 
C_oo<^+- ovde-v , Pa i le.d +o expunae pe-K-i-/Or\jLr'.s 
A \ S o p l " - N Q ^ y y-e.poi--f- ** 003Z33 Pi-on-N pe.-Vi4-iOru2.r5 
p^tSors Pi(J2- and airNyLoKe.»-e_ ejes +KQ4- J?O<2-K 
record n^ay Qppeai^-. 
(SEEL: Cor-N-U-^ Vs , E_xK,b»4- - 6 ^  
£)n M a y 31 , /<HI , dov-.r-Nq +Ki2_ pe.-h-Wor\iL>-s 
pc\v-oLa_ kjLcxnna , Board mj2jv^be.v- me -^\-K-^ .v-
CjOoKe. rv^ade- re.Pev-e.naQ. 4o pe--l-i+io>n€>- s 
d\Scup\»no^y v-epo^-l- # 0O3Z3<? aw i +o v-ePer-emOLS 
4-ue.we.6P. 
(SEE- : £yK.bi4--A ^ AP^cWi - r »^ Suppo-V 
oP *rropecoi^»osi+y ^ iMftflNrt* - A ^  
X.4- i£ 4-Ke. C u 5 + O r ^ qnsd p^aC+iOL O P 
4-Ke LH-^K S-Va-k_ G>oo>y-& aC P a p o n s +n HPV^J'LO 
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Q l - r t - w Q pc\»--OLX_ D U C \ ^ y nvji_tA»--i i NV_I . 
Tk-e-»~e-Fow-e- , +Kv"s pnac-Wca. Q I / O O J ^ 4-M_ Board 
Op PokV-dor\S +0 e x o r v M o J L 4Kfl- p^-+-i'4-iowO-r.5- iAm<3 -R 
O-l'SCjpWnav-y r ^ p o v - + " ^ 0 0 3 2 . 3 9 , a n d Qny a n d a l l 
O-VK-e-v- k-£jC_ov-as r--eJa4-ma -fo di-Sc-iplmOr-y r€paH--f 
^ 6032.2,^. 
S ^ B 5 T A M T X N € - DUE. P R O C E S S R X ^ K T S VIELRE. 
\(X.OUATE-0 6 1 THE- U T A H STATE. B O A R Q O F 
PAROOMS 
TK-e_ p€-.4-»-V»ar\£-.v- au^ ->>vQ a P<A*-OLQ_ 
b o a ^ a k£__a^r^ , Ocx-\-€_A ^A\ay 31, iq<?/") U^QS 
q\-4ry\-e_4 ^ p A r o U . a a k . o P C M a y \\, 1393^ by 
Goav~a a P P a p o n s . r ru j -ob^.^ H-ea-Vk£u- Cooka. . 
/ s (-SEE". E x K i b . 4 - - R&C) 
n On ;TurN£_ ^ , | q q | AP+e>- G, re\ ie. iuO oP 
o u b r ^ » H e d iAfo^rY^a-V-iOrN an<d aoo<d C a u s e . 
appeAvi'rNQ.^ T K J L d f a h . S-Ka4-e_ Boav-a O P 
P c \ v - a O n S r h o A i P i e ^ -V-KG- p-e-+*i'4-i'or>Ji-r-".S paroCQ_ 
dcvVe. o P ( M a y ii , iqq3^ a ^ a inc.r2_Q.seq +-hji_ 
P^-V\H-ione>-5 p c \ v o U . da4-e, +-o', ('oc-V. i i , /q<?q ^ . 
/q v ^ SE.E.; Exhi"br+ - B. ^ 
T h e - pe_-W-Wor\e_v- ^uas r\o4- alloL^eA -ho 
Knauo Oo'KA"V- ioFbv-rv-NO^ion bjQS b€.iAa 
Sobt^-si "H--e_A o r r€-li'e-d u p o n ddr-ir^q V^,'5 pqv-o^*. 
Ke.Ov-ir>a oP, ( M a y 31, 199/^ a n d pqroOL r£.Vi€-UJ 
O f , ( ^ u n e . L4} iWl) . ThJL koar-d o P FhrdanS 
P a i l + 0 p r O M l d e . +-KJL- p-€3-i'4-i"OrxQ-K- U j i+ -h a n y 
Goaa. C a u s e . , u>-rt+e.^ Or- o-l-Ke>-ujf5€., 05 -to 
+Ke_ B o a r d s d££.iSi'On +o i n C_ren.se. +h_l-
peA-vV\C>n-e-i-'s pGv^lcL. da-Ve- b y , ^/"7- nnon-VK^ 
o ^ q o o d c a o S £ - Qs +o 4-Ke. G>ac-.r-ds d€.a'Si"On 
•+o e x c e e d . 4-K€_ U W * \ .SerY\-emc.»nc| qui'diL.\»nes 
b y ^ Frve. yeo,v~s . 
( / 0 ^ <9«n NNav-o-s n , i q q ^ T h e J-t-aK 3-V*vf«-
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a ^ d qood Coose_ Qpp-eAt-i'no^ Th-e. J-faK 
£VcvVe_ B o o » ^ o P Pav-don>5 rv^ode. a pa>~oC£_ 
d^u 'S i 'on o f , ^Mo CHAMGE.^ I^As/i'nq p£-"\-/4-K3n£r-
U3k-\-K a n ^oc-V. II, IQVH*) pa.r0La_ daPe.. 
/ . ^ . f5EE/. £xh.b(4- -E.^) 
A q a t ^ j p-e.-V-i4-ior^j- b o a s noV aHouaed Po 
Qr \d v-€_\i£_d Upor-> d u r m q +h-€- h € - Q ^ i n a , AJO»— 
did 4K£_ pe f i 'V iOn£ . r \-e-<iQj\ie- any aood Caose. 
ParoU2_ B o a r d s d€_ciS)'or, 4o Ke-e-p p£.-WPion€-r-
\>NC.ar.S£.ra*V-£jd , ( IH1 - m o n t h s "^  O u K i d h i'S 
C £>0 - n^or\-\-Ks ^ OM€~^ i-Ke- i i k h jSejn+e-nCi'nQ 
QCCOrdar-NCQ. -fo U f a K Admi rMS+ra-Wv-2- Ccd€. 
iqqj
 ) AN(N1: J .(ll-in-v (3s) uott-K a-Ha-kihed 
0FTi'^aNi+ es+-c\bli'SK»na indi'^ej-sV SPa-V-ds . 
PeA-rV»orAe.r r6^ue.sPe.d r e c o r d s , -fr^n-ijcwp-Ks 
C>w Cop»£-S O P r~e-COrds ( L o ^ C e ^ n i n O par0^2_ 
hiL^v-irv^S , f May 31, W O / ^ v j n e q , / q q ^
 ) jr^d 
4o pws do+€_ or April , /qqz . 
T M F / / T A K ^?rATE- R n A R n n r P A R O O M S 
FAX-UE.D TO R p L L o v J T H E . UTAH SEf4TE>lCl.MC, 
A ^ O R e L E A S E . ^ I X U D E L U I L N I E S ANID O E L ^ F D 
PErrirnLQs4E.R EQA7AL. PfiarEjrrxoNi usiPE-K 
T H E . LANNI 
T K - e . La-Va -^s CorrNir--N\SSJOr>» Or \ £-r\ rv-M o»C\\ Qc>d 
«SenVe.r>ona ar^d r-ejease- qordjL.\me.s ^ TO nnnnp Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pvovhd£__ 4-KJL. bosrs Pov- Se-n-Ve-ncu n<} a n d release. 
O P C n r v M r v a l o P P e . n d e . v - S . - ~T~Ke_ Pov-rv-»olo"i~> O n O P 
4-we qoidi2_.\rines ooas poi— +-KH. p u r p o s e c>P 
e ^ V ^ b h s K m a a U n i P o ^ r n -SyS-he.ro 4-Kr-ouqKoo+ 
Ufav-N s o +-KQ-\- pe.v-.soos o ^ 4-Ke_ SarrUL 
b o ^ e K O r - O o n d a n d U o K o Corr-MTv-M-H- Q Sirr-M lav -
ofPe*~vse uoi'H r e c e i v e Siroilov- .Sen-fences. 
re^i4-»on-e-r- durirNC| Ki"5 mc^av-sev-ra-V-iOn ha.S 
Ka<^ a, Nle,v-N rv^irsirv^al Qrooo^i- oP di'scipl'nqi-y 
P^Db(j2_rvNS . Pe+r4-i*on€_r- KQS coropu_-^ed and 
*-eco_weA a £ .E. .D. Ce^f.r,co.+-e-, Hr<)K SaHoal 
d ip loma, and K Q S pav-4-iCipo4e<i a a d COmpta.-ved 
dv-u^ <^  a\ecKol pK-oc^v-arns a s w € . n os , s t r e s s 
c\nd anqe^ - proa»-aroS. Pe.4-t4-loner is cicd-iveiy 
pav-ViC\paVinc^ i n -fKe. \|iO(j2_ni- OFFend^-r-S 
pv-o< r^-am and i s K e e c w i o a E^xceJien-V- r-epo>-*fs. 
Pe-\-»4-»^nek- has aLso pav-f ic»p<34ed i n a 
pub\^c_ auoav-erxi2-S5 p ro^nQn^ , by Sps-akmCj 
-(-o yoo-VHS aboo*V 4Kfl- C o ^ S ^ u e n Q L S OP 
C r \ r \ ^ \ r N a \ be .Ha . \ | i o >-• N leNev - -hK j2 -U_S5 , 
p e f i ^ - i O n ^ v h Q 5 v - e n - v Q i n e d mC_QrvSe>-a4ed Fbv-
O N € - * - ~ ^ / I 3 - P o O n - V K s ^ C o K ' C K )S ( ZS1 - m o n t h s ^ 
OMe>- 4-He. U f a K Sen-Ve-no'nQ ^oi 'd jL imes a \ -
4 b \ ' S 4- i roJL • P£-A-»'4-iOne.r- 6 o i l | h a \ e -Spe rvh 
£ o e \ \ ONl€-v- floO- morvV-hs ^ o P i n C ^ i - . S £ . r a - W O n . f>^€.n 
h e is eNervYualiy r-^c\U.ase.d i n ^oc-i-. f i , iqqv ) . 
(SE.E.: E x K i b i f - £ 1 A lso ' , "Time. /viaVr-i X ) 
T h e So^4ej-\c»na au ide lmes provided by 
4-KJX. S-V-a-Ve, pro\irdL2_ a n -exp£e4-a-\-ion o P 
Lib^v-"Ky ooKieK is enJb-Ued -f-o D o e Pr-aces.s 
Pro-Vex-Vicn, Ur,de.v- +hiL J-kaw S-Va-^e 
Cons-h-Vu-Won • T h e s e , CJUideimes Cr-ea-k. o n 
evpea.-VaVion by +hfl- ServlenC-ma yx-udqQ- an<j 
4-KO. pd-»4-ioi^ev-, -f-Ko-f +h£- sen-Venca. co»'H 
Q p P ^ O X i r a a k . + K i L S e p e . v - i b d S Op ~HrnJL • 
T h e . p-r~esej-\\- d u s f o ^ Qr^d proc-Vrco- o r -+hs_ 
defe-r^dan-Vs* d e n \ Due. proc£_ss and Fai i -f-o 
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oVHe>-Go i\se-, QS +o 4-KiL. d e c i s i o n i n d e n y m q 
pa^O<-^- O ^ e,XCe.-edinO +Ki2L A J + ^ K .£ej-vf-ef\C.i'na 
7 u i d J L l i n e . S . TH-e- de-Rs-r^darvV-s pr-e_se.rvf C o s l o n n 
n& P^ -QCVI 'CJL /'.s -ho b r o a d a ^ d / e a v e s p»-/'.soniLKs* 
op^-o -ho qrbi4-ra»-y aoV>'onS Qr>dl dec i s i ons by 
VK£_ J 4 - A K S"\-C-Ve_ B o q v - d o P Pdr -donS , OoK i 'CK I'S 
VVNJ2_ pr-es-e-wV- c a s e , q-V- b a r - . 
T K € _ Se*-N-VejniCfi_ | o - x p o S € i d O n pe_i-i-Hor>\e.r- , 
bsf -V-KJ2- G>oa*-A o P p a e o n s r £ O u i " r € S + K a V 
p€_V»-\-\Ors€-^ S p e j o d ( IH1- nr»orvt-KS^ o P 
irNCarsd-vnaVron . Th-e>-€.' »3 no ^ ios-HPica-Won 
rOv - 4-K^- l"rv>poS»'"WOr\ O p Q n / IH"7 - nnOn'VK ^ 
ServVe-nGz. m qrvy o P *f-he. mq-b-ic^-s used 
by 4-Ki2_ BoQr-d o P Par-dons . ~TK£. Seo-tenCi'n^ 
o F pe.-W4-rone.r- 4-o (im- mor^^s) \'s an 
av-bi'4-r-o.r-y a n d c a p r i c i o u s d e o s - j o n b^ i-he_ 
feoa,\~d o P P o > - d o n S a r \ d »S u rNSoppo r -4 -qbG2 . . 
(tip.-) 
A p p i - o p r - i a V e . pon j ' sK r r \<Ln4- P o r - -PKJ2_ C ^ 1 ^ S 
C o r y M + f e . ^ b v pe - \ - i 4 - tOnJLK- / S .S-e.4- Pbv-+-K j'r-N 
-+-KQ- mcvVr-rcjLS . T K L Soov-di oP P a r d o n s 
C K o s e . +0 de.\no,4€- Pnon^ -pbose. ma4-r-ica-S 
Por- n o £yplai'nqbG2_ o - ^ u s + i PI abca_ r^qsonS. 
I K a V a \ \ o P 4-K€- P<or-e_q.ctrNq Pac_Vs a n d 
QC_VvM\-\-i€-S ooe-r£_ C c n d o c > e d b y 4-hJL O e P e n d o n V s 
\r\ N j i o l a V O n O P p€-4-i'4-i'Orvj2j-'S // 'be.r-4-y , p rOCf ldo rq ) 
Q n d S o b s V A ^ 4 - i M ^ _ Cor\S+r4-u+i 'Oi^Q \ r-<q K-VS • 
OH') 
TKe_ p r - e ^ i a ^ m ^ / / s f i r ^ a o P D o e . p r o c e s s 
p r o c e d u r e . )'S rvD-f rWLan4- 4 o b e . e ^ h q u s H ' v e . . 
Dfscc\ie>- ,y i n 4-Kf.S C o s e , n - ^ y r f i .N€o l 0 4-hJi-r-
dePrcje-nc-jes U;K<CK r-e^oir-e ruico irnp^rnen-Vq-kon. 
OP pt-ocj2jdur-£_s or- Sobs+anViN£- C h a n g e s . 
Tko^V 4-Krs \siri4- oP Mab-eas Cor-pus seeks 
\reA\r-as3 o n H-KJ2_ spe .c . iT ic rna-H-ews miinV>6nj2.d 
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to 
Hold an e_\iid£jr^ -V-av-^  Ko-a^ioQ a 4- OOKI'CK 4-/rr\2_ 
£Ni'dfiJ^CQ- rv-^Y b-e_ O P P ^ ^ d C o n c e r n » ' o q 4-kiL 
4 o proC.-e.ejd ( j o i - fKouV p»-e.- poyme_n>t- OP CJOS+S , 
p€_e5 , Or- oA-K£U- qSS£-Sm£.^ -hs . 
('SEE:: A^PidaMi'-V in Suppo*-+• o P tr^pf i i .uhi 'osr4-y ^ 
Car-arvV- p-s_4-i-f i'G)-M2-ir- -+-K£_ c3U"VKo>-i'4-y 4 o 
obV<a*r\ S u b p o e n a ' s i"n> Por-r^a, paop-e>-)S
 } 
/-£.cjo>-ds r^L£SLSSQY-\j +0 e:xpQi^d ar^4 ass/S-j-
fr^ pvoop o P fdiC-Vs q n d ac-Wvj+/£s a iux jed 
# ir-x 4-KfiL Pov-£-C}0\'r\c7 C o m p)q j rvV~. 
x^sue. a \ iV i+ oP Habe_os Compos 
D r t l e v - i n q 4-KJL- y-&b2j3Se, C p p € > i 4 - i On<£_r-
Pr -Oi^ i-WiL CuS-Vody O P <d£.FervdQn>i-S. 
AppoirvV pe.4-i-Vione.t- Counse.1 -ho Y-a.pY-e.se~r\ 
K\r^ i ^ h,s pe-Vi-f-ion Poh- VNI^I-P O P Habeqs 
Cov-pos . 
Pe.-\-i-Won€-v- mNiVes -hhi's ^)our+ 4o 
cjv-a -^V -SuC-K o-V-Ki2_p- »-€Je.i P a s mo^y b-e, 
app»~op>~ra-V€. and dispose. o P -hKa_ roaJ4£r-
a s louo and ^-usVrcQ. \~e.qu)Y-e.s . 
(l.*) MaV^L q P i n d i n Q - b h a V d2-p£,nda<n+.5 C^re^ 
< *~\ s / l C ^ a V l O r ^ O P C o U v b 5 O r A ^ | V \ * 
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1139 UTAH SENTENCE AND RELEASE GUIDELINES Appx. D 
Form 4 
TIME MATRIX 
USC2 TC CAISVLATC MXNXMUM TXM£ IT I t N T t K C t XI ZSZXXZZWZZ:: 
cJtiKS SEVERITY 
CAFXTAL I l i t H O I K Fttsot etXMtt I WT IK ! ! " • " • ? " "
 a M I ***l* CtXWfS I 
J mm xx otatt | *** • " JJJ J « *** " » | , o SSX S M s u | 
O T I t t l Xt* | NXtl tNIAMOtt 
FAX* 
ratjurt ' 
0000 
R t U B ? 
12 TM 
i t TM 
t Ttf 
t TM 
1 TM 
3t MOO 
! I t MOM 
It TM 
t TM 
S Ttf 
S TtS 
1 TM 
1 
t TtS 
I TM 
« Tt f 
3 TM 
X TM 
1 S t MOM 
w j 
IS MOM 
14 MOM 
S t MOM 
S t MOM 
1 4 MOM 
! 1 1 MOM 
I t MOM 
2 4 MOM 
2 1 MOM 
I t MOM 
I S MOM 
1 2 MOM 
.COT!VI tlllAJtSXflCMTI 
I t MOM | 1 2 MOM 
"_____ _ NCCHXNT f 
1 1 1 MOM 1
 »*» 1 
19 A00W I 
1 t MCM 
V MOM 
2 1 MOM 
I t MOM 
I S MOM 
| l 2 MOM 
I'l l MOM 
T t . O . f . • 
| t MOM 
: t Men 
I S MOM 
1 2 MOM 
t MOM 
J f MOM 
J t MOM 
1 »»» 
; : MOM 
: s MOM 
I t MOM 
4 MOM 
S MOM 
I . 1 M 0 M 
1 SMOM 
f MOM 1 
1 MOM 1 
4 MOM 1 
I MOM 1 
J 3 MOM 1 
| 3 MOM | 
1 3 MOM J 
oacc o : s n u j . : : w or o v u ssot 4 U S I O U T I A ^ KASUAT SMSQLS u ca»s: : tua - i CMIS* CA;KU 
ACTIVE CONVICTIONS 
DtGttS TIMS MONTHS 
MOST SSftXOCS 
NEXT KOST SSRXOUS 
OTHtt 
OTHER 
SUTtXKU SIC0L9 CtHtW.LT I t C0«CUlXt*7. lOMtVtt. T i t BCSTtffCt 
Of ?IX fOlLCVXMO AGOAAVATXK eitCOMSTAJlCU S6CSUT eOMSXIttATXOM 
or eowtcrrivi surttieu: 
i . t i c m oa rooxrrvt 
2 . m o t t sortavxs:o« o t IAXL tXLtASt « i t » o r m s t M M COMM:;*I 
3 . OMUSCAL VXSTIK V U H U A H U T T 
4 . X U C I T TO rtasoN oa r a o r t a t r t o s s MAS tzTtSMX rot etXMt CAitcctT 
5. OfTtMSt eiAAACTUXttO IT UT1XJ* ClOttTT Ot OtFAAVXTY 
tr Tit StMTtMCt AAC TO St CONSteOTtVt. OSt Tit e&MStCCTlVC tNCIAMtMtMTt 
fOtTXOM Of T*t TXMt MATSXI" fit ALL COMStCOTXVt StMTtMetf ClCtTT Tit 
•MOST saxous* eoMvxerxoM. 
COWXTXOKS O r F t O I A T X O l l : 
TOTAL M0MT1S / 3 • MONTIS TO M SttVtO Af A COMOXTXOM OT FftOIATXOM 
MtttU 1 "AS A COMOXTTOM- MQMTP • ISO eOMMUMXTT StIVXSt «00M • SSOO fT*t. 
TOTAL 
JUL 
com. sxtvict uif. 
rxiit * . 
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